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Abstract: A common requirement in policy specification languages is the ability to map policies to the underlying net-
work devices. Doing so, in a provably correct way, is important in a security policy context, so administrators
can be confident of the level of protection provided by the policies for their networks. Existing policy lan-
guages allow policy composition but lack formal semantics to allocate policy to network devices.
Our research tackles this from first principles: we ask how network policies can be described at a high-level,
independent of firewall-vendor and network minutiae. We identify the algebraic requirements of the policy-
mapping process and propose semantic foundations to formally verify if a policy is implemented by the correct
set of policy-arbiters. We show the value of our proposed algebras in maintaining concise network-device con-
figurations by applying them to real-world networks.
1 INTRODUCTION
Managing modern-day networks is complex, te-
dious and error-prone. These networks are com-
prised of a wide variety of devices, from switches and
routers to middle-boxes like firewalls, intrusion detec-
tion systems and load balancers. Configuring these
heterogeneous devices with their potentially complex
policies manually, box-by-box is impractical.
A better approach is a top-down configuration
where device configurations are derived from a high-
level user specification. Such specifications raise the
level of abstraction of network policies above device
and vendor-oriented APIs (e.g., Cisco CLI, Open-
Flow). Doing so, provides a single source of truth,
so, security administrators for instance, can easily de-
termine who gets in and who doesn’t (Howe, 1996).
In recent years, several research groups have pro-
posed high-level policy specification languages for
both Software Defined Networking (SDN) (Soule´
et al., 2014; Reich et al., 2013; Foster et al., 2010;
Prakash et al., 2015) and traditional networks (Bartal
et al., 2004; Guttman and Herzog, 2005). A com-
mon requirement in these languages is the ability to
map the abstract policies to the underlying physical
network. Doing so accurately, is essential to:
• enforce policy correctly;
• track policy changes per network device, so, re-
dundant policy updates can be avoided;
But, mapping policies to the physical network devices
has challenges:
• policy needs to be decoupled from the network
(i.e., free of vendor and network-centric minu-
tiae). A policy shouldn’t need to change when the
device vendor changes, or every time IP address
changes occur;
• the mapping must be formally verifiable. Precise
and unambiguous mathematical semantics would
eliminate wishful thinking pitfalls in deploying
policies to networks. These semantics give, for in-
stance, security administrators assurance that their
intended policies are enforced by the correct fire-
walls, rendering the expected security outcome.
• policies can have complex semantics including
node and link properties; and
• the mapping should be as efficient as possible.
The solution we propose provides a generic
framework to map policies to network devices alge-
braically. We illustrate it’s use by considering secu-
rity policies, because incorrect deployment of these
policies in domains such as Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks can result in
catastrophic outcomes including the loss of human
lives! However, the principles involved, can easily
be extended to policies involving traffic measurement,
QoS, load balancing and so on.
In developing our algebras, we have derived
the properties and constraints of sequentially- and
parallelly-composed policies for various policy con-
texts. These policy-composition semantics must be
preserved, when mapping policy to devices, to ensure
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correct deployment. Using an algebraic framework
also makes the policy-mapping process efficient.
We will describe the implementation of our pro-
posed algebras and demonstrate their use in deploying
security policies to real SCADA networks. Particu-
larly, we will show it’s value in maintaining a clear,
concise set of firewall configurations. Moreover, our
approach allows administrators to conduct “what if”
analysis by changing policy and/or network topology
and observe their effect on the network devices re-
quired to implement the changes.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED
WORK
“The advantages of implicit definition over construc-
tion are roughly those of theft over honest toil.”
Bertrand Russel
The quote is salient because network installations
are commonly built from bottom-up, i.e., a network-
device is purchased, and configurations written. The
policy is the result of the configuration, which is the
consequence of a purchasing decision. So, the pol-
icy is implicitly defined as a result of many small de-
cisions that interact in complex ways. Instead, best-
practice guides (Byres et al., 2005; ANSI/ISA-62443-
1-1, 2007) suggest designing the policy first, and only
then determining how to implement it.
Solutions that employ such a top-down network
configuration approach have been proposed in both
SDN (Soule´ et al., 2014; Anderson et al., 2014;
Prakash et al., 2015) and traditional networks (Bartal
et al., 2004; Cisco Systems, 2014). They allow cre-
ation and maintenance of a single high-level network-
wide policy (i.e., source of truth), so network admin-
istrators can easily determine, for instance, who gets
in and who doesn’t. These high-level policies should
be decoupled from network and device-vendor intri-
cacies, so they capture the policy intent and not the
policy implementation.
Capturing intent has several benefits: it allows
policy to be distinguished from network to assist with
change management; it enables accurate comparison
of organisational policies to industry best-practices to
evaluate compliance; and it allows policy semantics
to be expressed without network intricacies like IP ad-
dresses. But, most research towards high-level policy
languages (Bartal et al., 2004; Cisco Systems, 2014;
Soule´ et al., 2014), still requires hostnames and/or IP
addresses to be explicitly input to the policy specifi-
cation, to implement policy on a network instance.
If the high-level policy definition is built on formal
mathematical constructions, then there are no implicit
properties and it provides a truly sound foundation
for everything that follows. The formalism would al-
low construction of complex and flexible policies and
support reasoning about the policies. For instance,
we could precisely compare a defined policy with in-
dustry best-practices in (ANSI/ISA-62443-1-1, 2007;
Byres et al., 2005) for compliance and reduce network
vulnerability to cyber attacks (Anonymous, 2016).
It is equally important to map policy to devices us-
ing a formal approach. For instance, we can be con-
fident of the blanket of protection provided for our
network if and only if we could prove that an intended
security policy is implemented by the correct set of
network firewalls. Existing top-down configuration
languages (Bartal et al., 2004; Prakash et al., 2015;
Cisco Systems, 2014) allow creation of network-wide
high-level policies, but lack means to allocate policy
to network devices in provably correct way.
In our related work (Anonymous, 2015), we have
developed a high-level security policy specification
that is network and device-vendor independent to per-
form top-down configuration of network firewalls.
The language semantics allow these high-level poli-
cies to be easily understood by humans. In this paper,
we investigate the underlying requirements for map-
ping high-level policy to network devices.
3 ABSTRACT POLICIES
Abstractions are key to constructing high-level
policies. A good policy abstraction should capture the
underlying concepts naturally and concisely. For in-
stance, a policy may be arbitrated using one or more
network devices. A good abstraction should decouple
what is arbitrated from how it is arbitrated.
A simple abstraction that is commonly used to de-
couple policy from the network is (endpoint-group,
edge) (Anonymous, 2015; Bartal et al., 2004; Soule´
et al., 2014; Prakash et al., 2015). An endpoint is
a grouping of elements based on common physical
or logical properties- e.g., a subnet, a user-group, a
collection of servers, etc. An endpoint is also the
smallest unit of abstraction a policy can be applied
to. An edge specifies the relationship between the
endpoints, i.e., it describes what communication is
allowed between the endpoints. An edge typically
consists of a Boolean predicate (i.e., classifier) that
matches traffic packet header details to perform some
action. An edge from endpoint S1 to S2 with predicate
R means that a correct implementation should act in
some specified way toward traffic from all members
(e.g., hosts) in S1 to those in S2 satisfying R.
Consider the example network in Figure 1(a), our
high-level policy might be – “we want to measure all
HTTPS flows from S1 to S4”. This intent can be ex-
pressed using the (endpoint-group, edge) abstraction
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(a) Network topology. (b) Policy graph of (a).
Figure 1: Example network consisting of four endpoints
(S1− S4) and six policy arbiters A,B, ...,F (a). The corre-
sponding policy graph is shown in (b) with these endpoints
and policy edges (E1,E2, ...,E6) between them.
as p:=S1 → S4 : collect https, where p ∈ P is
an element of the possible space P of policies.
We now want to map the policy to enforcing de-
vices (i.e., arbiters). It looks naively easy. Just imple-
ment the policy on arbiter F . However, the problem is
in general more complicated. For example, consider
policy from S1 to S2. If arbiter A captures flows de-
scribed by policy pA and likewise pB, then the combi-
nation is pA∩B because the policy expresses that flows
be collected but load balancing across the two paths
could result in either being used by a given packet.
For another example, consider policy from S2 to
S3. If arbiters C and D capture flows described by
policy pC and pD respectively, then the combination
would yield their union because both arbiters in the
path are used for flow collection. So, when mapping
policies to network devices, they must be composed in
a way that preserve the topology-specific semantics.
We will, in general, denote the policy composition
resulting from parallel routes as pA⊕ pB and that re-
sulting from serial routes as pA⊗ pB. In this example,
pA⊕ pB = pA∩B and pC⊗ pD = pC∪D. Note though,
the meaning of ⊕, ⊗ are policy-context dependent.
The problem of mapping our high-level policy p
(from S1 to S4) to network devices, may even be more
complicated than simply implementing the policy on
F . What happens if F drops out? Surely we would
still want to collect HTTPS flows that traverse the re-
dundant paths from S1 and S4 (e.g., path via S2 and
S3). So, p must also be mapped to the policy arbiters
along the path S1−S2−S3−S4, to cater for this re-
dundancy. But then, should we map the policy to all
of these arbiters or a subset of them?
Given the parallel routes between S1 and S2 it is
easy to see that we need to map p to both A and B to
preserve the semantics of⊕. But, when arbiters are in
series (e.g., C,D) we have the choice of mapping pol-
icy to both or just one to preserve the semantics of ⊗.
Mapping to both may be unnecessary and inefficient
and arbiters may have limits on their capabilities.
(a) Network of 3 endpoints connected
to a single device.
(b) Policy hyper-graph
model of (a).
(c) Policy simple-graph
model of (a).
Figure 2: Policy-graph definition alternatives.
The policy arbiters may not always be in series or
parallel. For instance, consider the star-topology in-
volving the endpoints S3,S4 and S5 in Figure 2(a).
The question of how to map policy to topology gets
interesting in this case. We could loosely map policy
to arbiter G using a hyper-edge E7 (Figure 2(b)). But,
doing so adds to the complexity of the policy-graph
and decreases it’s precision. For instance, it allows a
1 : n relationship between hyper-edges and policies,
so, we must track the policy of every endpoint-pair
in a hyper-edge to correctly map it’s policy to net-
work devices. Also, a hyper-edge could potentially
map to a large portion of the network (e.g., when in-
terconnected to many endpoints), so, it’s policy can
be complex, difficult to understand and debug.
We can overcome these problems by using a
simple-edge mapping instead (Figure 2(c)). By doing
so, we also gain significant benefits. For one, the pol-
icy graph is simplified and it’s precision is increased–
the 1 : 1 relationship between edges and policies now
mean we only need to track a single policy for each
edge, to map policy accurately to devices. For an-
other, our simplified abstraction (endpoint-pair, edge)
behaves as a network-slice (Gutz et al., 2012)– a piece
of the network that can be programmed independently
from the rest of the network – so, debugging policy
errors is easy. Moreover, users from distinct policy
subdomains (e.g., Engineering, Corporate Adminis-
tration) can manage the network-slices (i.e., policy-
edges) applicable to their domain.
We may also need to consider paths that consist of
one more intermediate endpoints, when implement-
ing policy between an endpoint pair. For instance,
consider implementing a security policy f :=S1 →
S3: http in the network in Figure 1(a). Once im-
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plemented on the arbiters (i.e., firewalls), the policy
should allow HTTP traffic flow from S1 to S3. But,
the policy can only be deployed correctly if endpoints
S2,S4 can route or forward HTTP traffic.
This ability of an endpoint to route or forward
traffic can be restrictive. For instance, in a security
policy context, an endpoint can group systems (e.g.,
hosts) with similar security requirements (ANSI/ISA-
62443-1-1, 2007). So, high-risk systems can be
grouped in to one endpoint and only safe traffic that
originate and/or terminate at the endpoint is permit-
ted by the security policy. Enabling this endpoint
to transit-traffic could potentially expose the high-
risk systems within to cyber attacks. So, an end-
point’s traffic transitivity capability must be consid-
ered in constructing valid device-paths between end-
points and captured explicitly in the mapping process.
The intent of our high-level policy p is to col-
lect HTTPS flow data from S1 to S4. Similarly, traf-
fic measurement policies can be defined between any
pair of endpoints in the network, so the correspond-
ing (endpoint-pair,edge) tuples collectively construct
a policy-graph (Figure 1(b)). Each (logical) edge in
this graph maps to a physical network path compris-
ing of policy arbiters and zero or more intermediate
endpoints. For instance, policy-edge E4 in Figure
1(b) implements our policy p.
So far, we have described several key require-
ments of a policy-to-device mapping process. We
next illustrate these using more detailed examples in-
volving a typical set of policies found in practice.
The examples also show the use of our (endpoint-pair,
edge) abstraction in high-level policy description.
3.1 Quality of Service (QoS) Policies
QoS policies can be used, for instance, to provide
bandwidth guarantees for certain types of traffic. The
policy arbiters in this context, would commonly be
QoS capable routers or switches. Imagine we need
to provision a minimum bandwidth of 100MB/s for
HTTP traffic flow from S1 to S4 in Figure 1(a). The
high-level policy intent can be expressed using the
endpoint-pair S1, S4 and an edge (E4) between them:
min(S1 → S4 : http, 100MB/s). In reality, sim-
ilar QoS policies between any endpoint-pair can be
expressed using the same policy-graph in Figure 1(b).
Parallel and serial (QoS-device) topologies also
have an impact on the end QoS policy. Consider the
parallel topology between S1 and S2 in Figure 1(a), if
we assume pA and pB provide bandwidth guarantees
of B1 and B2 respectively, then with load balancing,
the resultant QoS policy (pR) can provide a total band-
width guarantee pR = pA⊕ pB = sum(B1,B2).
When the devices are in series (e.g., topology be-
tween S2 and S3 in Figure 1(a)), the resultant policy
provides a bandwidth guarantee given by pC⊗ pD =
min(B3,B4) where B3,B4 are the bandwidth guaran-
tees provided by pC and pD.
This example highlights how policies can be com-
posed using the generic semantics ⊕ and ⊗ in differ-
ent policy contexts. The actual meaning of these op-
erators is policy-type dependant. For instance, in the
traffic measurement policy example, ⊗ represented
union while here it has meaning of minimum.
We can see that endpoint traffic-transitivity also
impacts the ability to implement a QoS policy cor-
rectly in the network. For instance, consider policy
min(S1→ S3 : http, 50MB/s), the required band-
width guarantee can only be provided if S2,S4 routes
or forwards traffic to S3.
3.2 Security Policies
The security policies we consider here are access-
control policies in a network. The policy arbiters in
this context, would be traffic filtering devices (e.g.,
firewalls, SDN switches). The endpoints could be
zones or user groups. Imagine we want to enable only
SSH traffic from S1 to S4 (Figure 1(a)). The high-
level policy can be expressed using the endpoint-pair
S1, S4 and an edge between them as S1 → S4: ssh
with an implicit deny-all in place.
When the traffic filtering devices are in parallel
(e.g., topology between S1 and S2 in Figure 1(a)), the
resultant security policy (pR), has meaning- all pack-
ets that can possibly be allowed through – and is the
union of the packet sets allowed through by the indi-
vidual devices. We take union conservatively because
intrusions and attacks are usually carried out through
permitted traffic. So, if pA and pB allows packet sets
Q and T respectively, then pR = pA⊕ pB = pQ∪T .
When the devices are in series (e.g., topology be-
tween S2 and S3), the resultant policy permits the in-
tersection of the packet sets V,W allowed by the poli-
cies of C, D respectively -i.e., pR = pC⊗ pD = pV∩W .
With security policies, it is often useful to have
endpoints that group systems with similar security re-
quirements. Doing so, allows to define a single pol-
icy for all members of an endpoint– a clean and con-
cise abstraction of network security. But, a generic
(endpoint-pair, edge) abstraction cannot capture such
network-security specific policy concepts precisely.
So, we need concrete definitions for what an end-
point and an edge means for each policy context to
capture policy-specific intricacies. We will show later
how to define these concretely for security policies.
3.3 Traffic Measurement Policies
Traffic measurement policies can be used to imple-
ment, for instance, NetFlow (v9) on the example
network shown in Figure 1(a). The policy arbiters
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A,B, ...,F here, would be NetFlow capable devices
(usually routers or switches). The endpoints could be
subnets or zones in the network.
When we considered the parallel routes between
S1 and S2, the resultant policy (pR) with meaning–
the flows that are guaranteed to be captured by the
topology (without sampling), constitutes of the inter-
section of the packet sets of A and B. So, if pA and
pB capture packet sets Q and T respectively, then
pR = pA⊕ pB = pQ∩T .
We also showed that when the devices are in series
(e.g., topology between S2 and S3 in Figure 1(a)), the
resultant policy captures the union of the packet sets
V,W captured by the policy of the devices C and D
respectively, i.e., pR = pC⊗ pD = pV∪W .
Policy Mapping Vs Routing: We can see that in
mapping policies to network devices, our discussion
above relates to network paths or routes. This is no
accident. The problem we aim to solve has many par-
allels with routing. But here,
• we often look for all paths, not just best paths.
• we do not need to employ decentralised protocols.
A logically-centralised implementation can offer
a robust and efficient solution as demonstrated in
SDN (Anderson et al., 2014; Foster et al., 2010;
Soule´ et al., 2014; Prakash et al., 2015).
The aim in routing is to determine the path that op-
timises a given path-metric (e.g., shortest-path routing
finds a path between endpoints with a minimum dis-
tance). Our target problem is different: we need to de-
termine the set of arbiters in a network a given policy
should be implemented on. So, constructing all fea-
sible paths is crucial because, for instance, a security
policy between two endpoints can only be correctly
implemented (e.g., to block all Telnet traffic) if all re-
dundant paths between them are taken into account.
We also expect a relatively low number of end-
points (e.g., in §6 we will see this number is typically
< 25 in a SCADA network), through network group-
ing. As we will show in § 5, a low endpoint-count
makes our policy-mapping algorithm computation-
ally tractable. So, a logically-centralised implementa-
tion can be considered. But, in routing, the number of
endpoints (e.g., individual gateways) can be high for
a large network, so, distributed means to computing
a solution is essential (requiring de-centralised proto-
cols like OSPF, BGP) . Our policy-mapping algorithm
can also be implemented distributedly if necessary.
Algebras have also been proposed in meta-routing
(Dynerowicz and Griffin, 2013), to provably choose
paths that optimise various path-metrics. But, these
algebras do not support specification of node proper-
ties such as traffic transitivity. Specification of link
properties is possible and we could translate node
properties to link properties, but, the workaround is
not elegant. A better approach is to have an algebra
that capture node properties explicitly.
We described in §3.2, the need to define endpoints and
edges concretely for each policy context. By doing
so, we can incorporate the intricacies associated with
each policy type. We illustrate the idea next using
security policies and their concretised (endpoint-pair,
edge) abstraction- the Zone-Conduit model.
The Zone-Conduit Model: Lack of internal-network
segmentation is a key contributor to the fast prop-
agation of threats and attacks in a network (Byres
et al., 2005). So, ANSI/ISA have proposed the Zone-
Conduit model as a way of segmenting and isolat-
ing the various sub-systems in a SCADA network
(ANSI/ISA-62443-1-1, 2007).
A zone is a logical or physical grouping of an
organisation’s systems with similar security require-
ments so that a single policy can be defined for all
zone members. A conduit provides the secure com-
munication path between two zones, enforcing the
policy between them (ANSI/ISA-62443-1-1, 2007).
A conduit could consist of multiple links and firewalls
but, logically, is a single connector.
It is easy to see that the Zone-Conduit model
is a concrete instance of the (endpoint-pair, edge)
abstraction for high-level security policy specifica-
tion. The zones and conduits are concrete definitions
of endpoints and edges. In defining them, impor-
tant network-security characteristics such as a single
zone-policy, are captured concisely.
The Zone-Conduit model abstracts how security
policy is enforced, so users can focus on what policy
to enforce. The model intuitively decouples policy
from topology, so, high-level security policies can be
described free of network and vendor intricacies.
The ISA Zone-Conduit model in its original de-
scription lacks precision for policy specification. We
use the extensions proposed in (Ranathunga et al.,
2015b) to increase its precision, e.g., we add Firewall-
Zones to specify firewall-management policies.
Zone-Conduit Policies: A conduit policy is essen-
tially an ordered set of rules [p1, p2, ..., pn] that act
on packet sequences to accept, deny, or in some
cases, modify them. In our related work (Anonymous,
2015; Anonymous, 2016), we have identified proper-
ties and constraint required in a Zone-Conduit based
policy description to make these rules vendor and de-
vice (i.e., implementation) independent and have rule-
order independent semantics.
To summarise, we adopt a security whitelisting
model, i.e., we restrict policies to express positive
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(a) Zone-Firewall model. (b) Firewall-path model of (a).
Figure 3: Example of traffic packets traversing a single firewall interface twice. As shown by the path in red, if traffic from
zone 1 to 2 is allowed to transit zone 3, firewall interface e0 is traversed twice. In this situation, the direct path from zone 1 to
2 is more efficient. So, we deem firewall path A13A32 invalid (i.e., =φ), since h(A13) = h(A32) = A, where h : F →W.
abilities1 and deny all inter-zone flows that are not ex-
plicitly allowed (Anonymous, 2015). Doing so, ren-
ders the rule order irrelevant in a policy, allowing the
policy to be converted consistently to different vendor
firewalls. So, the underlying vendor can change with-
out requiring policy alterations. Policy makers can
also add or remove policy rules oblivious to the or-
dering of the rules. By being explicit, we also prevent
services being accidentally enabled implicitly.
Directed- vs Undirected-Conduit Policy: The policy
on an undirected-conduit can be expressed using two
directed-conduit policies. Directed-conduits are im-
portant in understanding how policy should be imple-
mented on device interfaces. For instance, consider
implementing a security policy p := Z1→ Z2 : htt ps
on the network shown in Figure 3(a). An undirected-
conduit can only map the policy to firewall interfaces
e1,e2. But, to implement the policy correctly, we ad-
ditionally need to know if it should be implemented
inbound or outbound on these interfaces. A directed-
conduit provides this directionality.
However, analysis using directed-conduits can
also lead to problems. For instance, it seems feasible
to implement our policy p along the path highlighted
in red in Figure 3(b). But further inspection of Figure
3(a), reveals that traffic packets traversing this path
would require to traverse firewall interface e0 twice.
We invalidate such directed-conduit paths via a
mapping h : F →W where F = {directed f irewalls}
and W = { f irewalls}. A directed-firewall in the
Zone-Conduit graph G = (Z,C) is defined as
Definition 1 (Directed firewall). A directed firewall
ti j is a firewall t ∈W that filters traffic on directed-
conduit (i, j) ∈C.
Then we can check if the directed-firewalls in a path
map to the same physical firewall (i.e., h(A13) =
h(A31) = A) and deem that path invalid.
1Refers to the ability to initiate or accept a traffic service.
4 MAPPING ALGEBRA
We now outline our proposed algebras to map
high-level policy to network devices. We start by
making the distinction between primary and sec-
ondary policy-edges, and then later show how the lat-
ter can be derived algebraically using the former.
4.1 Firewall-path Construction
As we described earlier, a policy-edge enforces policy
between two endpoints in a network. A policy-edge
can be classified as a primary- or a secondary-edge
depending what arbiters are implemented within. A
primary-edge can enforce policy only using policy ar-
biters. A secondary-edge enforces policy using both
arbiters and one or more additional endpoints.
We demonstrate the idea using security policies
and the simple Zone-Conduit graph G= (Z,C) in Fig-
ure 4(a). The firewall composition of each primary-
conduit in the model is shown (Figure 4(b)). The ex-
ample secondary-conduit C13 filters traffic flow from
zone 1 to 3, using several directed-firewalls and transit
zones 2, 4. The set of all directed-conduits are given
by DC = {Ci j | (i, j) ∈C}.
A policy-graph is essentially an automation that
moves traffic packets from one endpoint to another us-
ing policy-edges. So, regular expressions (the natural
language of finite automata), can capture the packet-
processing behaviour of this model; a path encoding
is a concatenation of directed-devices (i.e., policy-
arbitration steps pq) and a set of paths is encoded as
a union of paths. Past work (Anderson et al., 2014)
has shown, all single-path encodings stem from the
Kleene star operator (*) on the set of directed-devices.
In a security policy context, the automation means
that a single firewall-path encoding is a concatenation
of directed-firewalls. Each path depicts a sequence of
traffic filtering steps and is an element of F∗.
But, the Zone-Conduit model is a logical repre-
sentation, so, every firewall-path encoding in F∗ may
not be valid. We follow the design principles below
to filter-out invalid paths:
6
(a) Zone-Conduit model with primary
and secondary conduits.
(b) Firewall-paths of the primary-conduits in (a).
Figure 4: Zone-Conduit model depicting primary-conduits Ci j and a secondary-conduit C13 enabled by the transit zones 2
and 4 shown in (a). The firewall-paths of the primary-conduits are shown in (b).
• non-elementary paths in the Zone-Conduit model
must be excluded.
• when traversing elementary Zone-Conduit paths,
traffic packets shouldn’t traverse a particular de-
vice interface more than once. So, for directed-
firewalls ti j, t jk ∈F the concatenation ti jt jk is valid
iff h(ti j) 6= h(t jk). We demonstrated the idea using
the simple example in Figure 3 earlier.
• traffic cannot flow through a non-transit zone.
Typical zones this restriction applies to are the
protected SCADA-Zones and Firewall-Zones.
We have outlined the design principles for con-
structing a single firewall-path in a network. In actual-
ity, these principles and methods apply equally when
constructing device-paths in other policy contexts.
We define single firewall-path concatenation
based on the above design principles
Definition 2 (Single firewall-path concatenation).
Take a ∈ F∗ s.t. a = td1d2td2d3td3d4 ...tdndn+1 where
tdid j ∈ F. Also take b ∈ F∗ s.t. b =
sg1g2sg2g3sg3g4 ...sgmgm+1 where sgig j ∈ F. Then
firewall-path concatenation from F∗×F∗→ F∗ is
ab =

td1d2 ...t
n
dndn+1
sg1g2 ...s
m
gmgm+1 if dn+1 = g1
and gi 6= d j; ∀i, j, i > 1
and h(tdid j) 6= h(sgkgl ); ∀i, j,k, l
φ, otherwise.
and aφ= φa = φ; ∀a ∈ F∗
Concatenation in Definition 3 is a binary operation
that constructs only elementary firewall-paths.
Consider two directed-firewalls X ,Y with policies
pX and pY that accepts packet sets R and T . The resul-
tant policy of the concatenated firewall-path XY has
an action similar to that of sequential firewalls and
can be denoted as (pX ⊗ pY )(s) = pR∩T (s) where s is
a packet sequence. The resultant policy action also
depends on the policy context,. For instance, with
traffic measurement policies, the outcome is similar
to that of serial arbiters- i.e., pX ⊗ pY = pR∪T .
We define a set of directed-firewall paths as a
union of elements in F∗. Again, consider our
directed-firewalls X ,Y from before. If these described
two distinct paths, then the resultant policy of the
path union X ∪ Y is that of parallel firewalls, i.e.,
(pX⊕ pY )(s) = pR∪T (s) where s is a packet sequence.
This result is also context dependent, so, for traffic
measurement policies, the outcome is similar to that
of parallel arbiters, i.e., pX ⊕ pY = pR∩T .
We also extend concatenation in Definition 2 to
S = {Power-set of F∗}
Definition 3 (Multiple firewall-path concatena-
tion). Take a,b ∈ S s.t. a = {a0,a1...,ax},b =
{b0,b1, ...,by} where ai,b j ∈ F∗. Then firewall-path
concatenation from S×S→ S is given by
ab = {aib j}; ∀i j
Then, Definition 3 allows all possible sets of firewall
paths to be constructed from the union of elements in
S (i.e., ∀a,b ∈ S, a∪ b ∈ S). Then (S,∪, ·, 0ˆ, 1ˆ) is an
idempotent semiring with
0ˆ = φ; empty set; and
1ˆ = {ε}; empty-string set where ε is the identity
element of the concatenation operation.
It is important to note here that the properties of the
operators ∪ and · actually dictate rules for firewall-
path construction. So, when valid firewall-paths are
built, they must be composed in a way that preserves
these semantics. For instance, ∪ is commutative while
· is not. So, the order of the directed-firewalls matter,
when constructing a single firewall-path, but, are ir-
relevant when constructing multiple paths.
Similarly, we can construct single and multiple
device-paths for other policy contexts and obtain the
semiring result for (S,∪, ·, 0ˆ, 1ˆ) per security policies.
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4.2 Mapping Policy to Arbiters
In the previous section we described how the semiring
(S,∪, ·, 0ˆ, 1ˆ) constructs sets of device-paths between
policy-graph endpoints. The sequential (i.e., ⊗) and
parallel (i.e., ⊕) policy-composition operators in § 3
can now be used to construct the policies of these
paths. For instance, assume we have to implement
a high-level policy pi j on arbiters qkl that lie in the
paths from i to j. All applicable device-paths from
i to j can be constructed as per § 4.1 and given by
Si j = {qa1a2qa2a3 ...qan−1an , .....,qb1b2qb2b3 ...qbm−1am}.
Then, the high-level policy p′i j derived from the in-
dividual arbiter policies p′kl is
p′i j = (p
′
a1a2 ⊗ p′a2a3 ...⊗ p′an−1an)
⊕ (....................................)
⊕ (p′b1b2 ⊗ p′b2b3 ...⊗ p′bm−1bm). (1)
Mapping the intended high-level policy pi j to the
arbiters is now a matter of finding p′i j for all arbiters
such that p′i j = pi j. But deriving such a mapping is
non trivial because the meaning of ⊕ and ⊗ depends
on the policy context. For instance, with security poli-
cies ⊕ means union and ⊗ means intersection. So, a
simple solution that supports defence in depth would
be to implement the access-control policy pi j on ev-
ery sequential firewall across all paths.
For another instance, ⊕ means summation and
⊗ means minimum in QoS policies. So, a required
bandwidth guarantee pi j can be split across multiple
paths with sequential arbiters in each path guarantee-
ing only a portion of the total bandwidth.
Similarly, with traffic measurement policies, ⊕
means intersection and⊗means union. So, each path
must implement policy pi j. This can be achieved in
multiple ways: (i) we could implement pi j on every
sequential arbiter of a path for redundancy; or (ii) ef-
ficiently have only one arbiter per path implement-
ing the policy; or (iii) find an intermediate solution by
partitioning pi j between sequential arbiters in a path.
Irrespective of the policy context, the underlying
requirement when mapping policy to network devices
is to adhere to the semantics of (1).
4.3 Computation of All Firewall-paths
We have managed to reduce the policy-to-device map-
ping problem to the semantics of (1) in the previ-
ous section. We now describe how an algorithm can
be developed to compute the device-paths of (1) effi-
ciently. Again, we demonstrate the idea using security
policies and the Zone-Conduit model.
We can represent the firewall-paths of the
primary-conduits using a generalised Adjacency ma-
trix A. Here, A(i, j) is the firewall-path of primary
conduit Ci j ∈ DC. For our example in Figure 4(b),
A =

Z1︷︸︸︷
{ε}
Z2︷ ︸︸ ︷
{A12,B12}
Z3︷︸︸︷
φ
Z4︷ ︸︸ ︷
{E14}
{A21,B21} {ε} {C23,D23} φ
φ {C32,D32} {ε} {F34,G34}
{E41} φ {F43,G43} {ε}

(2)
Given such a matrix A, the solution to the problem
of finding the set of all valid firewall-paths between
zones is a matrix A∗ such that
A∗(i, j) = {valid primary- and secondary-conduit
firewall-paths from zone i to j} (3)
We developed the following right iteration algo-
rithm2 to compute A∗, inspired by algorithms in meta-
routing (Dynerowicz and Griffin, 2013). In doing so,
we allow the node property: traffic transitivity, to be
explicitly specified via a zone-transitivity matrix T .
A<0> = I
A<k+1> = (A<k>T ∪ I)A (4)
The zone-transitivity matrix T is defined as
T (i, j)=
{
{ε} if i = j and zone transitivity(i) = 1
φ, otherwise.
(5)
and I is the multiplicative-identity matrix
I(i, j) =
{
1ˆ if i = j
0ˆ, otherwise.
(6)
For bounded semirings we only iterate n−1 times
to converge to A∗, where n is the number of nodes in
the Zone-Conduit model, i.e.,
A∗ = A<n−1>
We have defined T , A∗ and the right-iteration al-
gorithm for a security-policy context, but these can
equally be defined for other policy contexts.
If we apply our algorithm in (4) to the example in
Figure 4(b), n = 4, so, A∗ = A<3> and let’s assume
for simplicity that all zones are transitive. Then
T =
{ε} φ φ φφ {ε} φ φφ φ {ε} φ
φ φ φ {ε}
 (7)
and we see that I = T in this instance.
A<1> = (A<0>T ∪ I)A = (IT ∪ I)A
= (I ∪ I)A = A
A<2> = (AT ∪ I)A
2See appendix for proof.
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So, A∗ = A<3> = (A<2>T ∪ I)A ={ε} η κ θµ {ε} ν βγ λ {ε} ρ
ξ δ ζ {ε}
 (8)
where for instance
κ = {A12C23,A12D23,B12C23,B12D23,E14F43
E14G43} (9)
All valid firewall-paths from zone 1 to 3 are in κ.
Let’s now assume that zone 4 is non-transitive,
then zone transitivity(4) = 0, and by (5),
T =
{ε} φ φ φφ {ε} φ φφ φ {ε} φ
φ φ φ φ
 (10)
We re-calculate A∗ =
 {ε} {A12,B12} η θ{A21,B21} {ε} {C23,D23} µγ {C32,D32} {ε} ρ
ξ δ ζ {ε}
 (11)
where for instance
η= {A12C23,A12D23,B12C23,B12D23} (12)
The updated firewall-paths from 1 to 3 are in η.
In comparison to (9), we see that the paths via zone 4
(i.e., E14F43,E14G43) have now been removed as the
zone is no longer transitive. A∗ can similarly be cal-
culated for other policy contexts to determine all valid
device-paths between endpoint pairs.
We will next describe our implementation of the al-
gorithm in (4). The implementation allows us to use
these algebras to map policy to real network devices.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
Our policy mapping system is depicted in Fig-
ure 5, and we outline it’s details below. The system
is currently implemented in Python, and allows map-
ping of high-level policies written in our own policy
specification language, to network devices. We will
make the system open source in the near future.
High-level security policy: The topology-
independent policy input file created using our
high-level policy specification language.
Network topology: The input network topology de-
scribed in the XML-based graph file format GraphML
(Graph Steering Committee, 2003). The file holds in-
formation of all devices in the network and their in-
terconnections. The crucial aspects are the details of
the topology near the policy arbiters (e.g., firewalls).
Figure 5: Policy to network-device mapping process.
Map policy to network: Compiles high-level policy to
an Intermediate-Level (IL), generates the policy graph
(e.g., Zone-Conduit model) of the input network and
computes A∗ as per § 4.3 to map high-level policy to
the devices (e.g., firewalls) in the network.
Policy-to-device map: The primary output depicting
policy breakdown by device, interface and direction.
Verification output: Secondary output specifically
suited for verification (e.g., policy errors).
Our system implements a high-level policy on a net-
work by coupling the policy to the topology instance.
Details of the coupling steps are discussed in detail in
our previous work in (Anonymous, 2015). We outline
here, the steps taken to map policy to the network de-
vices. Again, we illustrate our implementation using
security policies and the Zone-Conduit model, but the
system can likewise be used in other policy contexts.
5.1 Zone-transitivity Matrix and
Adjacency Matrix Construction
Our system first builds the Zone-Firewall model, con-
taining the disjoint zones and their firewall intercon-
nections using the input network topology. Addi-
tional Firewall-Zones, Abstract-Zones and Carrier-
Zones (Ranathunga et al., 2015b) are added to the
model as required. The primary conduits are then de-
fined to create the Zone-Conduit model.
Next, the zone-transitivity capabilities are collated
by compiling the high-level policy to IL policy. Then
the n×n zone-transitivity matrix (T ) is constructed (n
is the number of zones in the network).
Implicit mappings between the primary conduits
and their firewall compositions are automatically cre-
ated when generating the Zone-Conduit model. These
mappings are leveraged to construct the adjacency
matrix A described in §4.3.
9
Algorithm 1 Right-iteration algorithm to compute
A∗. The additive and multiplicative operators of
Semiring S are ∪, · (§ 4.1). The additive and multi-
plicative identities of S are 0ˆ, 1ˆ. The multiplicative-
identity matrix and the zone-transitivity matrix are I
and T . The set of zones in the network is Z.
1: procedure RIGHTITERATION((∪, ·, 0ˆ, 1ˆ,A))
2: R0← I
3: k← 1
4: while k ≤ |Z|−1 do
5: for each i ∈ Z do
6: for each j ∈ Z do
7: if i=j then
8: Rk+1(i, j)← I(i, j)
9: else
10: Rk+1(i, j)← 0ˆ
11: for each q ∈ Z do
12: s← Rk(i,q) ·T (q, j)
13: Rk+1(i, j)← Rk+1(i, j)∪ s
14: Rk+1(i, j)← Rk+1(i, j)∪ I(i,q)
15: Rk+1(i, j)← Rk+1(i, j) ·A(q, j)
16: k← k+1
5.2 A∗ Calculation
We compute A∗ using the right iteration algorithm in
(4). Our implementation is given below (Algorithm
1). We consider a centralised implementation (given
typically low n), but, it can also be distributed across
multiple nodes performing parallel computations.
Lines 2,3,10 initialise R0, k and Rk+1(i, j) while
lines 5,6,11 range over the set of zones Z in the net-
work. At each step k, we store the result Ak+1 in Rk+1.
We can see that the above algorithm has time com-
plexity O(n4). This value suggests that the algorithm
performance decreases exponentially as the number
of zones in the network (n) increases. So, specifying
policy per individual host (i.e., zone size=1 so, large
n) in top-down configuration makes policy mapping
extremely inefficient. It proves more efficient to cre-
ate network groups (e.g., by subnet) and specify pol-
icy between them, so, a reasonably low value can be
maintained for n. For instance, we will see in §6 that
in a SCADA network typically n < 25. Our mapping
algorithm runs on average in 53 seconds on a standard
desktop computer for each of these networks.
In calculating A∗, we considered all valid paths be-
tween two zones (hence time complexity of O(n4)).
The decision allows us to permit or block traffic
along all possible communication paths between two
zones, providing redundancy and defence-in-depth in
the network. We also map policy uniformly to every
firewall along a single-path, further boosting defence-
in-depth. These decisions collectively create a more
robust defence against cyber attacks.
However, in other policy contexts, it may be use-
ful to select a subset of all valid paths or even just
a single path (e.g., shortest path) instead. Doing so,
could improve the time complexity of (4) (e.g., se-
lecting shortest paths would yield O(n3)). This path
pruning can be done, for instance, by incorporating a
sparse matrix in (4). It may also be efficient to apply
policy only on edge arbiters of a path, in some con-
texts (e.g., when enabling traffic measurements).
6 A SERIES OF CASE STUDIES
We now demonstrate the use of our policy-
mapping algebras, through seven real SCADA-
firewall configuration case studies summarised in Ta-
ble 1. The data was provided by the authors of
(Ranathunga et al., 2015b).
The seven Systems Under Consideration (SUCs),
involve various firewall architectures and models. We
use them to demonstrate several properties, most no-
tably that the computational complexity of our policy-
to-device mapping algorithm is tractable.
An important feature depicted in Table 1 is the
number of security zones in each network. This num-
ber is small (i.e., ≤ 21) relative to the maximum (po-
tential) number of hosts per network (i.e., ≤ 67580).
This is to be expected, a zone groups a set of hosts
or subnets with identical policies. If every host had a
distinct policy then a large number of firewalls would
be needed to enforce a real separation between the
hosts, making it impractical. By grouping hosts into
zones, we reduce policy complexity, so their specifi-
cation becomes easier and less error-prone.
The typically small zone-count, makes Algo-
rithm 1 (§ 5) computationally feasible. For instance,
the worse-case computational complexity involving
zones is O(214). In comparison, the worse-case com-
putational complexity involving hosts is O(675804)!
The average time taken by our system to map
high-level policy to network devices is 53 seconds per
case study. This is when the system is run on a stan-
dard desktop computer (e.g., Intel Core CPU 2.7-GHz
computer with 8GB of RAM running Mac OS X).
We identified incorrectly mapped (i.e., assigned)
ACL rules in each case study by parsing the fire-
wall configurations as per (Ranathunga et al., 2015b).
These errors were then classified into three groups:
incorrect-firewall, incorrect-interface and incorrect-
direction errors (Table 1). Incorrect-firewall errors
are ACL rules that are assigned to the wrong fire-
wall to begin with, i.e., the desired traffic filtering
could not be achieved by placing the ACL rule in
any of that firewall’s interfaces. Incorrect-interface
errors are ACL rules that are assigned to the correct
firewall but to the wrong firewall-interface, i.e., the
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Table 1: SCADA case study summary adapted from (Ranathunga et al., 2015b) (∗ includes backup firewalls, # ACL rule
allocation error).
SUC Config.
date
Fire-
walls∗
Zones Conduits Max.
hosts
ACLs Average
rules
per ACL
Incorrect
firewall#
Incorrect
interface#
Incorrect
direction#
Runtime
(seconds)
1 Sep 2011 3 7 11 67580 8 237 15 13 19 40
2 Aug 2011 6 21 81 2794 12 16 3 2 5 70
3 Oct 2011 4 10 17 886 8 6 2 1 4 43
4 Mar 2011 3 9 16 2038 3 80 5 12 13 61
5 Apr 2015 3 12 19 2664 12 677 15 8 26 47
6 Apr 2015 3 13 21 3562 8 1034 21 15 19 63
7 Jul 2015 6 15 22 3810 17 724 9 5 17 49
desired traffic filtering could not be achieved by as-
signing the rule inbound or outbound of that firewall-
interface. Incorrect-direction errors comprise of ACL
rules that are assigned to the correct firewall and
firewall-interface, but in the wrong direction (e.g.,
outbound instead of inbound).
As (Table 1) suggests, on average there were 10
ACL rules allocated to the wrong firewall, 8 rules al-
located to the wrong firewall-interface and 15 rules al-
located in the wrong interface-direction, per SCADA
case study. Hence, the intended security policy was
not correctly implemented in any of these mission-
critical networks! Needless to say, what chance do we
have in preventing financial loss or moreover, the loss
of human lives when our critical infrastructure have
incorrectly deployed security policies to begin with?
We automatically mapped the high-level policy in
each case to it’s network using our system. The gener-
ated policy rules were then checked for incorrect allo-
cations. There were zero incorrectly allocated policy
rules, when the policy was mapped to the firewalls us-
ing our algebras! So, the intended high-level security
policies were now correctly deployed to the firewalls.
By mapping policy to the correct set of firewalls, we
reduce vulnerability of these SCADA networks to cy-
ber attack and prevent catastrophic outcomes that re-
sult from such attacks.
7 CONCLUSIONS
There are various obstacles that hinder the precise
mapping of policies to network devices. Most promi-
nent is the lack of decoupling between policy and
network which makes policy sensitive to network-
intricacies and vendor changes. To compound the
problem, policies can also have complex semantics
including node and link properties.
Our research addresses these challenges and pro-
poses a mathematical foundation for mapping policies
to network-devices. We use it to deploy real-world se-
curity policies to network firewalls provably correctly,
so, that administrators can be confident of the protec-
tion provided by their policies for their networks.
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Appendix
Theorem 4 (A∗ calculation). A∗ can be calculated us-
ing the right iteration algorithm
A<k+1> = (A<k>T ∪ I)A where A<0> = I.
T and I are the Zone-transitivity matrix and
the multiplicative-identity matrix (of semiring
(S,∪, ·, 0ˆ, 1ˆ)) respectively.
Proof. Let’s check that the result holds for k = 0 (i.e.,
valid firewall paths between zones up to (0+1) hop).
LHS = A<0+1> = A<1>
RHS = (A<0>T ∪ I)A = (IT ∪ I)A
= (T ∪ I)A = IA = A
A<1> = A is true since all valid single-hop firewall
paths are represented by A.
Let’s assume the result holds when k = n, i.e.,
A<n+1> = ((A<n>T )∪ I)A.
So, A<n+1> holds all valid firewall paths between
the zones of up to (n+ 1) hops. Then A<n+1>(i, j)
represents all valid firewall paths of up to (n+1) hops,
between zones i and j (see Figure 6). So, valid fire-
wall paths up to (n+2) hops from i to k via j are given
by
(tik) j = A<n+1>(i, j)A( j,k) (13)
Figure 6: .
But zone j may not be transitive, so we modify the
above equation to account for this
(tik) j = A<n+1>(i, j)T ( j, j)A( j,k) (14)
But, when i = j the above equation yields φ,
whereas we expect {ε} to be the self-firewall path.
Again, we update the equation
(tik) j =
[
A<n+1>(i, j)T ( j, j) ∪ I(i, j)
]
A( j,k) (15)
Then, all valid firewall paths up to (n+2) hops
from i to k (via j,h...etc.) are given by
A<n+2>(i,k) =⋃
∀ j
[
A<n+1>(i, j)T ( j, j)∪ I(i, j)
]
A( j,k); ∀i,k (16)
We simplify the equation further
RHS =
⋃
∀ j
[
A<n+1>(i, j)T ( j, j)A( j,k)
]
∪
⋃
∀ j
I(i, j)A( j,k)
But, A<n+1>(i, j)T ( j, j) =
⋃
∀s
[
A<n+1>(i,s)T (s, j)
]
So,
⋃
∀ j
[
A<n+1>(i, j)T ( j, j)A( j,k)
]
=
⋃
∀ j
[
A<n+1>T
]
(i, j)A( j,k)
=
[
A<n+1>TA
]
(i,k)
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Also,
⋃
∀ j
[
I(i, j)A( j,k)
]
=
[
IA
]
(i,k)
Hence, A<n+2>(i,k) =
[
A<n+1>TA
]
(i,k) ∪[
IA
]
(i,k); ∀i,k
We can generalise the above to the matrices
A<n+2> = A<n+1>TA ∪ IA
= (A<n+1>T ∪ I)A.
13
